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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 8(a)(3)1 of the National Labor Relations Act (the
NLRA)2 proscribes employment discrimination undertaken to en-
courage or discourage labor union membership. An employer vio-
lates section 8(a)(3) by discharging or disciplining an employee as
punishment for participation in lawful union activity. A problem-
atic situation commonly occurs when an employer had lawful and
unlawful motives to discipline or discharge an employee. Courts
and commentators call this situation a dual motive case.3 Dual mo-
tive cases typically arise when an employer does not state specifi-
cally an illegitimate reason for its employment decision, but in-
stead relies upon a "just cause" defense to legitimize its action.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). Section 8(a)(3) prohibits employers from discriminat-
ing "in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization ..
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
3. See, e.g., Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1083-84
(1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
4. The "just cause" defense is a generic term that describes all legitimate reasons for
which an employer can discharge an employee. Employee inefficiency and misconduct are
1096 [Vol. 36:1095
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Consequently, when employer motivation in employment decisions
is unclear, parties routinely ask the National Labor Relations
Board (the Board) to decide whether an employer acted pursuant
to legitimate or illegitimate reasons .
5
The proper substantive approach to determine whether an
employer acted discriminately in section 8(a)(3) dual motive cases
has been the subject of prolonged disagreement, inconsistency, and
confusion among the courts of appeals,6 which have appellate juris-
diction over the Board. The Board has attempted to resolve this
confusion 7 but uncertainty still remains because the United States
Supreme Court has failed to provide a clear and consistent ap-
proach for finding discrimination in dual motive cases.8 The con-
flict among the courts of appeals primarily concerns two issues:
whether an employer's burden of proof to establish a business jus-
tification for challenged action is a burden of production or persua-
sion, and whether the courts of appeals should give much or little
deference to the Board's findings of employer motivation. Courts9
and commentators' ° have considered only the issue concerning an
employer's burden to prove business justification and have ignored
the proper roles of the Board and the courts of appeals in determi-
nations of employer motivation.
two possible legitimate reasons for discharging an employee.
5. See, e.g., Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. at 1084-86.
6. See id. See infra text accompanying notes 46-57.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 38-45.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 18-37.
9. Two Supreme Court justices recognized the need to resolve the conflict that exists
between the courts of appeals and the Board concerning the procedural nature of an em-
ployer's burden of proof. In Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 626 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2282 (1982), Justice White and Justice Rehnquist joined in
dissent to the Court's denial of certiorari. They focused on the conflicting views in the cir-
cuits concerning whether an employer has a burden of production or persuasion to prove a
business justification for disciplining or discharging an employee in a § 8(a)(3) dual motive
case after the Board's general counsel establishes a prima facie case showing discriminatory
action. The dissent stated: "In order to resolve this conflict on what is obviously a recurring
issue that should be resolved, I would grant the writ of certiorari." Id. After Red Ball, the
Court granted certiorari in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 674 F.2d 130 (1st
Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 372 (1982) to resolve the burden shifting problem.
10. This Note does not consider the question of which burden of proof shifts to an
employer after the general counsel establishes a prima facie case of discriminatory action.
This Note considers only the proper roles of the NLRB and the courts of appeals in deter-
mining an employer's motivation for disciplining or discharging an employee in a § 8(a)(3)
dual motive case. Professor Robert Belton has explored in detail the procedural nature of an
employer's burden of proof to establish a business justification for challenged action. See
Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Pro-
cedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. Rv. 1205 (1981).
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This Note advocates that the proper roles of the Board and
the courts of appeals in determining employer motivation in sec-
tion 8(a)(3) dual motive cases depends on whether the courts of
appeals classify discriminatory intent as a question of fact or law.
Classification of discriminatory intent as a question of fact for ini-
tial determination by the Board requires the courts of appeals to
review deferentially the Board's findings under the "substantial ev-
idence" standard of review set forth in section 10(e)" of the
NLRA. Classification of discriminatory intent as a question of law,
however, subjects the Board's findings on this issue to much
broader review by allowing the courts of appeals to substitute their
judgment for that of the Board.
A situation analogous to section 8(a)(3) dual motive cases oc-
curs in employment discrimination actions brought under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.12 Title VII proscribes employers
from discriminately discharging or disciplining an employee be-
cause of that employee's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin. Title VII cases arise when an employer discharges or disci-
plines an employee, usually without specifically stating an
illegitimate reason for its action. This stituation, as in section
8(a)(3) dual motive cases, presents the question whether an em-
ployer must act with discriminatory intent to violate Title VII.
The confusion that surrounds the proper roles of the Board
and the courts of appeals in determining discriminatory intent in
section 8(a)(3) dual motive cases does not exist in Title VII cases
because the Supreme Court, in Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 3 es-
tablished a clear analytical solution that courts can implement
under Title VII.14 In Pullman-Standard the Court held that dis-
11. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976). Section 10(e) of the Act states, in pertinent part: "The
findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence
on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive." Id.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976). Section 703(a) states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
13. 102 S. Ct. 1781 (1982).
14. See Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action: An Analysis of Competing
Theories of Equality and Weber, 59 N.C.L. Rzv. 531 (1981).
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criminatory intent is purely a question of fact reserved for the dis-
trict court's determination. 15 A court of appeals, therefore, may re-
verse a district court's finding of discriminatory intent only if it
concludes that the finding is "clearly erroneous" under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).11 If the court of appeals holds the
lower court's decision to be "clearly erroneous," it must remand
the case to the district court unless the trial record permits only
one conclusion of the discriminatory intent issue.17
This Note advocates use of the Pullman-Standard Title VII
model to define the proper roles of the Board and the courts of
appeals in determining discriminatory intent in section 8(a)(3)
dual motive cases. Part II of this Note discusses the current confu-
sion concerning the amount of discretion a court of appeals owes
the Board's finding of discriminatory intent in dual motive cases.
Part II also traces the Supreme Court's failure to define clearly the
proper roles of the Board and the courts of appeals in finding dis-
criminatory intent, the confusion this failure has caused, and the
Board's unsuccessful attempt to clarify this confusion. Part III de-
velops the Title VII model through a discussion of the Pullman-
Standard resolution of the proper roles of the district courts and
the courts of appeals in determining discriminatory intent in Title
VII cases. Part IV argues that courts properly may apply the Pull-
man-Standard Title VII model to section 8(a)(3) dual motive
cases. Part IV presents a four-part analysis to justify application of
the Pullman-Standard model. First, it demonstrates that because
the legal doctrines in both areas have experienced parallel and
analogous developments, section 8(a)(3) sufficiently relates to Title
VII to warrant application of the Pullman-Standard model. Sec-
ond, it discusses former circuit court characterization of discrimi-
natory intent as a question of fact and advocates a return to this
position. Third, it argues that application of the Pullman-Stan-
dard model will further Congress' intention that the Board assume
final responsibility for development of national labor policy subject
only to limited federal appellate court review. Last, it demon-
strates that the Court has characterized intent as a question of fact
outside the Title VII area and has used Pullman-Standard to de-
fine the proper scope of appellate review. Part IV then discusses
the implications of applying the Pullman-Standard model to sec-
15. See infra text accompanying notes 83-89.
16. See infra text accompanying note 86.
17. See infra text accompanying note 87.
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tion 8(a)(3) dual motive cases and concludes that discriminatory
intent should be a question of fact reserved for the Board's initial
determination and subject to only limited federal appellate court
review. In addition, Part IV argues that application of the Pull-
man-Standard model will require the courts of appeals to give the
Board's findings of discriminatory intent in section 8(a)(3) cases
greater deference under the "substantial evidence" standard of re-
view than they currently must give the district courts' findings in
Title VII cases under the "clearly erroneous" standard.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF DuAL MOTIVE CASES UNDER
SECTION 8(a)(3)
A. Guidance from the Supreme Court-Great Dane
Commentators have described the part that an employer's mo-
tive plays in determining the existence of section 8(a)(3) employ-
ment discrimination which encourages or discourages union mem-
bership as a "tangled web.""' The courts variously have viewed an
employer's illegitimate motive as: (1) evidence of a section 8(a)(3)
violation; (2) an essential element of a section 8(a)(3) violation; (3)
an element of a section 8(a)(3) violation that courts could infer
from the effect of an employer's action; and (4) an element in the
balancing process for the competing interests of employers and
employees. 19
The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers0 an-
nounced the current formula that establishes the necessity for and
the method of proving an employer's discriminatory intent in sec-
tion 8(a)(3) dual motive cases.2  Despite its vagueness the Great
18. Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor
Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALE L.J. 1269, 1273 (1968).
19. Id. at 1273-1314.
20. 388 U.S. 26 (1967). In Great Dane, an employer violated § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA by
granting vacation benefits to employees who worked during a strike and denying these bene-
fits to workers who struck.
21. Id. at 32-34. An historical analysis of the Court's major § 8(a)(3) decisions indi-
cates the development of its position concerning the necessity for proving discriminatory
intent and the permissibility of asserting a business justification for discriminatory action in
§ 8(a)(3) cases. In NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), the Court
held that permanent replacement of employees who struck for economic reasons did not
violate § 8(a)(3). The Court reasoned that the employer's interest in continuing its business
was a sufficient business justification for its discriminatory action. 304 U.S. at 345. In Re-
public Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945), the Court held that an employer's rule
which promoted plant efficiency and safety by prohibiting union solicitation during non-
working time lacked sufficient business justification for the discriminatory action even
though the rule discouraged solicitation without an illegitimate motive. 324 U.S. at 805. In
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Dane formula has shaped the course of Board and lower court de-
cisions since its introduction.2 It establishes guidelines concerning
the necessity for and the method of proving discriminatory em-
ployer motivation in two types of section 8(a)(3) dual motive cases.
First, if the employer's action is "inherently destructive" of an em-
ployee's section 7 right to participate in lawful labor union activ-
ity,"' the courts of appeals cannot require an employee to prove
that an employer acted with an unlawful motive.24 Second, if an
employer's action has only a "comparatively slight" effect on an
employee's section 7 rights, the judicial analysis varies depending
upon whether the employer introduces evidence of a legitimate and
substantial business justification for its discriminatory action.
Radio Officers' Union of the Commercial Telegraphers Union, AFL v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17
(1954), the Court held that an employer violated § 8(a)(3) by acting discriminately to en-
courage union membership. The Court reasoned that while unlawful motive and discrimina-
tory effect were elements necessary to establish a § 8(a)(3) violation, courts could infer mo-
tive and intent from an employer's conduct. 347 U.S. at 42-52. In NLRB v. Erie Resistor
Co., 373 U.S. 221 (1963), the Court held that the consequences of awarding superseniority to
nonstriking workers and replacements for striking workers, but not to striking workers, was
so destructive to the rights of striking workers that the employer could not avoid violation
of § 8(a)(3) by claiming a business justification for its discriminatory action. 373 U.S. at 227-
36. In Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965), the
Court held that certain legitimate employer activity could be a violation of § 8(a)(3) only if
a party could show that the employer acted with an illegal motive and effect. 380 U.S. at
274-77. In American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965), the Court held that
an employer lock-out designed to induce employee agreement to an employment contract
was not a violation of § 8(a)(3). The Court reasoned that the lock-out was not sufficiently
destructive of employee rights to warrant consideration of employer motivation. The Court
also emphasized that the employer's business purposes for the lock-out justified its action.
380 U.S. at 308-18. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 326-38 (1976). See generally
Christensen & Svanoe, supra note 18, at 1269; Getman, Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and
the Effort to Insulate Free Employee Choice, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 735 (1965); Oberer, The
Scienter Factor in Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Labor Act: Of Balancing, Hostile Motive,
Dogs and Tails, 52 CORN. L.Q. 491 (1967); Note, Intent, Effect, Purpose and Motive as
Applicable Elements to § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3) Violations of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 616 (1971); Janofsky, New Concepts in Interference and
Discrimination Under the NLRA: The Legacy of American Ship Building and Great Dane
Trailers, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 81 (1970).
22. R. GORMAN, supra note 21, at 335.
23. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organi-
zations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except. . .that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring mem-
bership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section
158(a)(3). ...
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
24. Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 34.
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When an employer does not introduce evidence of a legitimate and
substantial business justification, the Board may find a violation of
section 8(a)(3) without proof that the employer acted with an un-
lawful motive. If an employer, however, does introduce evidence of
a legitimate and substantial business justification, the Board's gen-
eral counsel must prove unlawful employer motivation.25
The Great Dane formula, however, fails to answer four signifi-
cant questions. First, it does not specify proper roles of the NLRB
and the courts of appeals in determining employer motivation in
comparatively slight cases, and it fails to clarify whether discrimi-
natory intent is a question of fact or law. Second, the Great Dane
formula fails to determine if the Board may balance the substanti-
ality of the employer's business justification with the severity of
the impact on the employee's section 7 rights to decide section
8(a)(3) comparatively slight cases. Third, the Great Dane formula
does not establish criteria for determining whether an employer's
conduct is inherently destructive or comparatively slight. Last, the
Great Dane formula does not specify if the burden of proof that
shifts to the employer in section 8(a)(3) is a burden of persuasion
or simply a burden of production. The Court's failure to answer
these questions has caused considerable confusion within the
Board and among the courts of appeals concerning the proper
method for analyzing these issues in dual motive cases.26
B. The Intolerable Confusion: Aftermath of Great Dane
After Great Dane, the Board and the courts of appeals
adopted three different standards for the proper procedures to find
and weigh discriminatory intent and business justifications in sec-
tion 8(a)(3) dual motive cases.2 7 First, the Board and five circuits28
applied variations of the traditional "in part" standard.2 9 The in
part standard requires a court to find a section 8(a)(3) violation if
an employee's participation in lawful union activity in any manner
or degree motivates the employer to discharge or discipline that
employee. Therefore, once the Board's general counsel makes a
prima facie showing of an unlawful motive, 0 the employer cannot
25. Id.
26. See Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. at 1084-86.
27. Lewis & Fisher, Wright Line-An End to the Kaleidoscope in Dual Motive
Cases?, 48 TENN. L. REv. 879, 881-89 (1981).
28. Id. at 884-85.
29. Id. See, e.g., Youngstown Osteopathic Hospital Ass'n., 224 N.L.R.B. 206 (1976).
30. Lewis & Fisher, supra note 27, at 885..
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escape liability by showing a legitimate business reason for its ac-
tion.31 Second, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit3 2 established the "reasonably equal" test. A section 8(a)(3)
violation under this standard occurs when an employer's illegiti-
mate motive is reasonably equal to its legitimate business reasons
for discharging or disciplining an employee. An employer can avoid
liability under the reasonably equal test only when the legitimate
business justification for its action outweighs its discriminatory
motive.33 Last, five circuits adopted variations of the "dominate
motive" test.3 4 A violation of section 8(a)(3) under this standard
occurs only when the Board's general counsel proves that illegiti-
mate motives outweigh the legitimate reasons for an employer's ac-
tions.3 5 Application of the dominant motive test has engendered
considerable disagreement between the Board and the courts of
appeals. For example, the First Circuit became so incensed by the
Board's use of a standard inconsistent with the dominant motive
test that it stated that it would refuse to enforce the Board's fu-
ture decisions unless the Board conformed. 6 If this disagreement
remains unresolved the courts of appeals likely will reach inconsis-
tent decisions in similar factual situations.3 7
C. The Board's Attempt to Provide Consistency in Section
8(a)(3) Dual Motive Cases: Wright Line
The Board attempted to clarify the confusion that Great Dane
created by introducing a new formula in Wright Line, A Division
of Wright Line, Inc." which purportedly would provide litigants
and decision making bodies with a uniform test for section 8(a)(3)
31. Id.
32. Id. at 885-86.
33. See, e.g., NLRB v. Longhorn Transfer Serv., Inc., 364 F.2d 1003, 1006 (5th Cir.
1965).
34. Lewis & Fisher, supra note 27, at 886.
35. Id. at 886-88. The First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits
applied the "dominant motive" test.
36. In Coletti's Furniture, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 1292 (1st Cir. 1977), the First Cir-
cuit remarked: "[T]here can be little reason for us to rescue the Board hereafter if it does
not both articulate and apply our rule." Id. at 1293.
37. Lewis & Fisher, supra note 27, at 888-89.
38. 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981). In Wright Line
the Board's general counsel alleged that the employer discharged the employee in violation
of § 8(a)(3) because the employee was a leading union advocate in prior election campaigns.
Wright Line denied this allegation, asserting that it discharged the employee for violation of
a plant rule against knowingly altering or falsifying production time reports, payroll records,
and time cards. The employee conceeded that he did not perform the jobs at the times that
his timesheet indicated but claimed that he performed the jobs on that day. Id at 1089-90.
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dual motive cases.39 The Board relied upon Mt. Healthy City
School District Board of Education v. Doyle,40 a nonlabor Su-
preme Court decision, to formulate this procedure. In Mt. Healthy
an untenured teacher claimed that the school board unlawfully re-
fused to renew his contract because he had revealed the substance
of a memorandum on teacher dress and appearance to a local radio
station.4 1 The teacher claimed that the first and fourteenth amend-
ments protected his right to communicate this information to the
radio station.4 2 The Court agreed that the first and fourteenth
amendments protected the teacher's communication. The Court,
however, reasoned that once the teacher had shown his constitu-
tionally protected conduct was a motivating factor in the school
board's decision, the school board deserved the opportunity to
demonstrate that it would have reached the same decision in the
absence of the protected activity.4 3 In Wright Line the Board
adopted the Mt. Healthy burden-shifting test for section 8(a)(3)
dual motive cases. It held that once the Board's general counsel
makes a prima facie showing that an employee's participation in
labor union activities motivated an employer's decision to dis-
charge or discipline the employee, the burden of proof' 4 shifts to
the employer to demonstrate that it would have taken the same
action in the absence of the employee's lawful conduct.4 1'
D. Discriminatory Intent After Wright Line
Despite the Board's formulation in Wright Line of a proce-
dure that shifts between employers and employees the burdens of
proving discriminatory intent and business justifications concern-
ing an employer's action in section 8(a)(3) dual motive cases, the
issue of the degree of deference that courts of appeals owe a
39. Id. at 1089.
40. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
41. Id. at 282.
42. Id. at 283.
43. Id. at 287.
44. In Wright Line, the Board arguably attempted to clarify the Great Dane formula
by holding that the burden of showing a legitimate business justification for its action,
which shifts to the employer in § 8(a)(3) dual motive cases, was a burden of persuasion. See
Belton, supra note 10, at 1275-80. The Board also provided that it could balance the com-
peting interests of employers and employees in "comparatively slight" cases by comparing
the substantiality of the employer's business justification with the severity of the impact on
the employee's § 7 rights. Wright Line, A Division of Wright, Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. at
1089.
45. Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc., 251, N.L.R.B. 1083, at 1089.
1104 [Vol. 36:1095
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Board's finding of discriminatory intent remains unanswered.-"
The importance of this controversy lies in the Board's inability to
enforce its decisions. Because it has no independent authority, the
Board must petition the appropriate federal circuit court to obtain
enforcement.47 Resolution of this issue depends on the reviewing
circuit court's characterization of the issue of discriminatory intent
as a question of fact or a question of law. If the courts characterize
it as a question of law, they can substitute their judgment of
whether discriminatory intent motivated an employer to discipline
or discharge an employee for the decision of the Board4 If the
courts characterize it as a question of fact, however, the "substan-
tial evidence" standard found in section 10(e) of the NLRA 9 re-
quires the courts of appeals to defer significantly to the Board's
finding of discriminatory intent.50 The courts would owe this de-
gree of deference to the Board's fact findings even in factual areas
46. The Great Dane opinion created a similar lack of resolution. See supra notes 18-
26 and accompanying text.
47. The NLRA does not provide for appeal of Board decisions to the federal courts of
appeals. If a party desires appellate review of a Board decision, he must refuse to comply
with the Board's order. The Board's general counsel then has the final authority to petition
the proper court of appeals for enforcement of the Board's order. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)
(1976).
48. Id.
49. See supra note 11.
50. In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), the Court concluded
that the § 10(e) substantial evidence standard was not
intended to negative the function of the Labor Board as one of those agencies presuma-
bly equipped or informed by experience to deal with a specialized field of knowledge,
whose findings within that field carry the authority of expertness which courts do not
possess and therefore must respect. Nor does it mean that even as to matters not re-
quiring expertise a court may displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting
views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the
matter been before it de novo. Congress has merely made it clear that a reviewing court
is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find
that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that
the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the
Board's view.
Id. at 488. See, e.g., Sioux Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 684 F.2d 1251, 1257 (7th Cir. 1982)
(stating that, even under the Wright Line dual motive case analysis, "a reviewing court is
bound to a substantial evidence standard and may not reject, absent the most exceptional
circumstances, [the Board's] properly supported findings of fact. . . ."); Zurn Industries,
Inc. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 683, 694 (9th Cir. 1982) (emphasizing that the courts of appeals
must defer to the derivative inferences the Board draws from evidence because of its experi-
ence and expertise); NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp., 90 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 12,496, at
26,406 n.5 (3d Cir. 1981) (remarking that the Third Circuit accepts the Board's inferences
and conclusions if the Board supports them with "substantial evidence on the record as a
whole" even though the substantial evidence standard does not require mechanical adoption
of the Board's and AU-'s findings).
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outside the Board's particular expertise."
After Wright Line the courts of appeals continued to display
confusion about whether discriminatory intent in section 8(a)(3)
dual motive cases was a question of law or fact, a question of ulti-
mate fact,52 or a mixed question5 3 of law and fact.54 A partial ex-
planation of this uncertainty is that the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the substantial evidence standard in Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB55 does not require the courts of appeals to charac-
terize discriminatory intent as a question of fact or law. Addition-
ally, the Court arguably encouraged overreaching appellate court
review of the Board's findings by remarking that it would inter-
vene in such appellate review only when the courts misunderstood
51. Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 488.
52. Pullman-Standard, 102 S. Ct. at 1788-89 n.16. Professors Cox, Bok, and Gorman
contend that:
The principles which guide appellate courts in reviewing questions of law and fact are
plainly of a very general nature leaving much to the discretion of the judges involved.
In exercising this discretion, courts will presumably be influenced to some degree by
such other factors as the respect they hold for the capabilities and impartiality of the
Board and the cogency and comprehensiveness of the arguments made by that agency
in support of its conclusions. These factors are unavoidably subjective and may there-
fore cause considerable variation from one court to another concerning the nature of
review. It is for this reason, perhaps, that there is often a significant disparity among
circuit courts in their rates of affirmance of NLRB decisions. For example, in the
Board's 1979 fiscal year, 84.6 percent of its decisions reaching the Third Circuit court
were affirmed in full there, while the Second Circuit court affirmed in full only 44.8
percent of the Board decisions it reviewed .... [Tihese [statistics] suggest that the
principles governing the scope and nature of judicial review should be taken as provid-
ing only the most general indication of the nature of review to be accorded by any
given court in a particular case.
A. Cox, D. BOK, & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 111-12 (9th ed. 1981).
53. One source explains the notion of a mixed question as follows:
Certain decisions, for example, involve "mixed questions of law and fact," as in NLRB
v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944), where the Board was interpreting the stat-
utory term "employee" but in so doing considered various factual questions, such as
the business relationship of newsboys to the newspaper and the economic power of the
former in dealing with the latter. Other decisions which appear to involve pure ques-
tions of fact, may actually contain principles of law. For example, if the Board should
conclude that employers who grant a wage increase during a representation campaign
interfere with the free choice of the employees in voting for or against the union, the
Board is not merely deciding the factual question of the effect of the increase upon the
minds of the employees; the Board is also laying down a principle of law that the risk
of interference in the generality of cases is sufficiently large that such increases should
be prohibited entirely without requiring the burdensome and perhaps impractical task
of investigating the effects of the employer's action in each case.
A. Cox, D. BOK, & R. GORMAN, supra note 52, at 110-11.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 130-49.
55. 340 U.S. 474 (1951); see supra note 50.
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or grossly misapplied the substantial evidence standard.56 Conse-
quently, the courts of appeals have refused to enforce the Board's
findings in many post-Wright Line dual motive cases, partially or
solely because they have bypassed the substantial evidence stan-
dard through characterization of discriminatory intent as some-
thing other than a pure question of fact.57
III. Pullman-Standard AND DISCRIMINATORY INTENT UNDER
TITLE VII
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Pullman-Standard v.
Swint ' s the federal district and appellate courts experienced as
much uncertainty concerning their proper roles in determinations
of discriminatory intent in Title VII cases59 as the Board and the
courts of appeals are currently experiencing in section 8(a)(3) dual
motive cases. This confusion existed in Title VII cases because the
courts of appeals classified discriminatory intent as a question of
ultimate fact.0 This classification allowed the courts of appeals to
56. Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 490-91.
57. Recent § 8(a)(3) dual motive decisions suggest that the courts of appeals classify
discriminatory intent as something other than a question of fact and do not defer to the
Board's discriminatory intent finding in many cases. See, e.g., Cedar Coal Co. v. NLRB, 678
F.2d 1197, 1198-99 (4th Cir. 1982) (enforcement denied and remanded with instructions)
(holding that the general counsel did not demonstrate a prima facie violation of § 8(a)(3));
Weather Tamer, Inc. v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 483, 491 n.4, 491-93 (11th Cir. 1982) (enforced in
part and denied in part) (stating: "[W]e are simply not willing to hold on this record that
such an intent has been demonstrated." Id. at 493); NLRB v. Cumberland Farms Dairy,
Inc., 674 F.2d 943, 949 (1st Cir. 1982) (enforced in part and reversed in part) (concluding
that the record was "without substantial evidence to support the Board's finding that these
terminations were caused by anti-union sentiment."); NLRB v. Eldorado Manufacturing
Corp., 660 F.2d 1207, 1214 (7th Cir. 1981) (enforcement denied) (reasoning that "To ascribe
any motive to these discharges other than a long overdue intolerance of ... [the employ-
ees'] acts would be to indulge in unwarranted speculation."); TRW, Inc. v. NLRB, 654 F.2d
307, 310 (5th Cir. 1981) (enforcement denied) (holding that the Board did not support with
"substantial evidence" its determination that the real motive for the company's actions was
retaliation for the employee's prounion activities); NLRB v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp., 651 F.2d 436, 437-38 (6th Cir. 1981) (enforcement denied) (rejecting an administra-
tive law judge's finding that the employer had at least a mixed motive for not hiring the
employee); Peavey Co. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 460, 461-62 (7th Cir. 1981) (enforced in part and
denied in part) (holding summarily that the "substantial evidence" standard did not sup-
port the Board's findings concerning the employee's discharge).
58. 102 S. Ct. 1781 (1982).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
60. The Fifth Circuit in Pullman-Standard combined the issues of the employer's ac-
tions and the legal consequences of those actions into a single issue labeled discrimination.
It classified the issue of discrimination as a question of "ultimate fact," and accordingly,
made independent determinations of the employee's allegations of discrimination. Swint v.
Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525, 533 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 1781 (1982) (citing
East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 339 (5th Cir. 1975)). Thus, the Fifth Circuit did not
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avoid the "clearly erroneous" standard of review set forth in Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a),61 ignore the district court's find-
ings, and make independent findings of discriminatory intent. In
Pullman-Standard, however, the Supreme Court resolved this con-
flict in Title VII Cases by classifying discriminatory intent as a
question of fact reserved for initial determination by trial courts
and subject to only limited appellate court review under the Rule
52(a) clearly erroneous standard.
In Pullman-Standard black employees challenged the validity
of a seniority system maintained by Pullman-Standard and the
United Steelworkers of America, the labor union that served as the
bargaining representative of many Pullman-Standard employees at
its Bessemer, Alabama, plant.62 Prior to Title VII's effective date,
the company pursued a racially discriminatory job assignments
policy, 3 and both the company and the union adopted the chal-
lenged seniority system.6 The system measured seniority by an
employee's length of service in a particular department, and em-
ployees forfeited all seniority rights if they transferred to another
department."5 The seniority system remained unchanged after Ti-
tle VII became effective. 6
The courts analyzed Pullman-Standard under the applicable
statutory language of section 703(h) of Title VII. Section 703(h)
protects the use of seniority systems provided that employers do
not establish different terms, conditions, privileges of employment,
or different standards of compensation with the intent to discrimi-
nate against certain employees because of their race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. 7 The wording of section 703(h) expressly
proscribes discriminatory intent, but does not address discrimina-
classify discriminatory intent as a question of pure fact.
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Rule 52(a) states, in pertinent part: "Findings of fact shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous .
62. 102 S. Ct. at 1783.
63. Id. at 1785.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Section 703(h) of Title VII which pertains to seniority systems, provides in perti-
nent part-
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide senior-
ity ... system,. . . provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
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tory effect. Thus, an employee cannot successfully challenge the
Title VII validity of a seniority system solely by showing it dispa-
rately affects employees, even if this result perpetuates pre-Act
discrimination."
Four findings supported the district court's holding that Pull-
man-Standard's seniority system did not intentionally discrimi-
nate. 9 First, it held that the seniority system was "facially neu-
tral" and that it "applied equally to all races and ethnic groups. ' '1 0
Second, the district court found the seniority system rational in
light of general industry practice.7 1 Third, it found that although
Pullman-Standard engaged in discriminatory employment prac-
tices, 72 the seniority system had no relation to those discriminatory
practices.7 3 Last, the court carefully examined the seniority sys-
tem's detailed history of negotiation sessions and contracts and
held that discriminatory purpose did not taint it. 4 Thus, the Dis-
trict Court concluded that the seniority system was lawful under
section 703(h) of Title VII because it did not operate with discrim-
inatory intent.75
On appeal the Fifth Circuit rejected the district court's dis-
criminatory intent findings and invalidated Pullman-Standard's
seniority system after an independent consideraton of the same
factors that the district court examined.76 First, the Fifth Circuit
purported to correct the legal standard under which the district
court evaluated the evidence by finding that it erroneously disre-
garded the qualitative differences between employment depart-
ments comprised primarily of black employees and those depart-
ments predominated by white workers.7 Thus, the Fifth Circuit
found that Pullman-Standard did not operate its seniority system
68. Pullman-Standard, 102 S. Ct. at 1784.
69. Id. at 1785. The district court examined the issue of discriminatory intent with a
test that the Fifth Circuit suggested in James v. Stockham Valves & Fitting Co., 559 F.2d
310 (5th Cir. 1977). In James, the Fifth Circuit stated that courts should examine the total-
ity of circumstances surrounding the development and maintenance of a seniority system in
determining whether it intentionally discriminated against employees. Id. at 352. James
then set forth the four factors that the district court applied in Pullman-Standard. Id.
70. Pullman-Standard, 102 S. Ct. at 1785.
71. Id. at 1786.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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equally.7 8 Second, although not purporting to correct legal error or
to review expressly the district court's findings under the "clearly
erroneous" standard, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court
by finding that the seniority system was inconsistent with general
industry practice. 9 Third, it contradicted the district court by
finding that racial considerations permeated the seniority system's
negotiation and adoption, and that the company and union dis-
criminatory practices, therefore, affected the seniority system.80
Last, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Pullman-Standard operated
its seniority system with discriminatory intent and invalidated it
under section 703(h) of Title VII.8 1 Unhampered by the clearly er-
roneous standard of Rule 52(a), the Fifth Circuit made indepen-
dent judgments concerning the issue of whether Pullman-Stan-
dard's seniority system operated with intent and suggested that it
did not classify discriminatory intent as a pure question of fact.2
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision and
held that discriminatory intent in Title VII cases is a pure ques-
tion of fact.85 The Court noted that Rule 52 does not apply to con-
clusions of law.84 It felt, however, that the issue of whether a se-
niority system operates with discriminatory intent under section
703(h) is clearly a question of fact proper for initial district court
determination subject to only limited appellate court review under
the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a).8 The Court, there-
fore, concluded that the Fifth Circuit could reverse the district
court's discriminatory intent finding only if it concluded that the
finding was clearly erroneous under Rule 52(a).86 In addition, the
Court held that if findings are infirm because of an erroneous view
78. Id. at 1786-87.
79. Id. at 1787.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1788.
82. The court of appeals explained clearly its view of the appellate function in deter-
mination of discriminatory intent in Title VII cases:
Although discrimination vel non is essentially a question of fact it is, at the same time,
the ultimate issue for resolution in this case, being expressly proscribed by . .. [§
703(a)]. As such, a finding of discrimination... is a finding of ultimate fact .... In
reviewing the district court's findings, therefore, we will proceed to make an indepen-
dent determination of appellants allegations of discrimination, though bound by find-
ings of subsidiary fact which are themselves not clearly erroneous.
Id. (quoting Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525, 533 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting East
v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 339 (5th Cir. 1975))).
83. Id. at 1788-89.
84. Id. at 1789.
85. Id. at 1790-91.
86. Id. at 1791.
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of the law, the court of appeals should remand the case to the dis-
trict court unless the record permits only one resolution of the fac-
tual issue.87 The courts of appeals have applied Pullman-Standard
extensively in the short period of time since it was decided.88 In
addition, courts have utilized Pullman-Standard outside the Title
VII area in trademark violation and bankruptcy cases.8 9
IV. APPLICATION OF THE Pullman-Standard TITLE VII MODEL TO
SECTION 8(a)(3) DuAL MOTIVE CASES
A. Justifications for Application of the Pullman-Standard
Model in Section 8(a)(3) Dual Motive Cases
The Supreme Court's classification of discriminatory intent as
a question of fact in Pullman-Standard settled the controversy
surrounding the proper roles of the federal district and appellate
courts in finding discriminatory intent in Title VII employment
discrimination cases. Several justifications exist for applying the
Pullman-Standard model in section 8(a)(3) dual motive cases to
resolve the analogous issue concerning the proper roles of the
Board and the courts of appeals in finding intent under the NLRA.
First, the doctrine in section 8(a)(3) and Title VII employment dis-
crimination law has experienced parallel and analagous develop-
ments. Second, two circuits formerly characterized discriminatory
intent as a question of fact in section 8(a)(3) cases, and Pullman-
Standard justifies a return to this position. Third, application of
the Pullman-Standard model will further one of Congress' inten-
tions underlying enactment of the NLRA-that the Board assume
final responsibility for development of national labor policy subject
to only limited federal appellate court review. Last, the Supreme
Court already has used Pullman-Standard outside the Title VII
area by implicitly classifying a district court finding concerning in-
tent in a trademark infringement suit as a question of fact.90 Thus,
application of the Pullman-Standard model in section 8(a)(3) dual
motive cases is reasonable because intent in labor law disputes is
more analogous to intent in employment discrimination cases than
87. Id. at 1792.
88. See, e.g., Chaline v. KCOH, Inc., 693 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1982). In Chaline, the
court commented that, "[a]lready the Fifth Circuit offspring of Pullman-Standard abound."
Id. at 480 n.3.
89. See, e.g., Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2182
(1982) (applying Pullman-Standard in a trademark dispute); Bittner v. Borne Chem. Co.,
Inc., 691 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1982) (applying Pullman-Standard in a bankruptcy dispute).
90. See Inwood Laboratories, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2182 (1982).
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in trademark actions.
1. Parallel Development of Section 8(a)(3) and Title VII
Discrimination
Section 8(a)(3) and Title VII doctrines have experienced par-
allel and analogous developments in three related areas: (1) the
legislative histories of the Title VII and NLRA statutes; (2) the
judicially developed doctrines that have evolved from interpreta-
tion of the two statutes; and (3) the interchangeable use by some
courts of NLRA and Title VII doctrine. These developments sug-
gest that the doctrines in these two areas relate sufficiently to war-
rant application of the Pullman-Standard model in section 8(a)(3)
dual motive cases.
(a) Parallel Developments in Legislative Histories
Several factors historically connect the NLRA and Title VII.
The purposes of the NLRA to prohibit unfair labor practices,91 and
Title VII, to proscribe discriminatory employment practices, 92 are
very similar. In addition, the Acts create administrative agencies
and, although each agency wields significantly different amounts of
authority, 3 they both enforce the statutory provisions. The agen-
cies also have independent offices of general counsel that conduct
litigation.9 ' The framers of Title VII, in addition, specifically used
the NLRA as a model for provisions in Title VII,95 and the Su-
preme Court explicitly has recognized relationships between the
two Acts.'
(b) Parallel Developments in Judicially Developed Doctrines
The Supreme Court in Great Dane developed a broad formula
for adjudicating section 8(a)(3) dual motive cases. This formula
91. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976).
92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to 3 (1976).
93. Cf. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-56, 161 (1976) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 to 5 (1976). The
NLRA created the National Labor Relations Board and Title VII created the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission to implement these statutes. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, however, is not responsible for the judicial function of hearing
and deciding complaints. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, see J. Vas, Title VII: Legislative History, 6 B.C. INDUS.
AND CoM. L. REv., 431, 434-37.
94. Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(b)(1) (1976).
95. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803-04 (1973).
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distinguishes between conduct that is inherently destructive of an
employee's NLRA section 7 right to participate in lawful organized
labor activities and conduct that has a comparatively slight affect
on these rights.9 7 In Great Dane, the Court held that once an em-
ployee shows that an employer's action was inherently destructive
of his right to participate in union activity, the employer assumes
the burden of "explaining away, justifying or characterizing" its ac-
tion as different from its facial appearance.9 8 The Board will find a
violation of section 8(a)(3) if the employer fails to justify its con-
duct, even though the employee does not show that the employer
acted with discriminatory intent.99
The Court has developed an analogous theory under section
703(a) of Title VII for adjudicating employment discrimination
cases. Section 703(a)(1) prohibits discriminatory treatment of em-
ployees, and section 703(a)(2) proscribes employment practices
that discriminatorily affect employees because of their race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.100 The Supreme Court under sec-
tion 703(a)(1) developed the "disparate treatment" theory of em-
ployment discrimination and, under section 703(a)(2), it developed
the "disparate impact" theory of employment discrimination.101
(1) Section 8(a)(3) "Inherently Destructive" and Title VII
"Disparate Impact" Cases
In disparate impact cases, once an employee or class estab-
lishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the
employer to show that its actions or policies are related to business
necessity or the employee's job performance.02 If the employer
meets this burden, the employee may rebut the employer's job re-
latedness or business necessity justifications by demonstrating that
they are merely a pretext for discrimination.0 3
The disparate impact Title VII cases are analogous to the sec-
tion 8(a)(3) inherently destructive cases. The Supreme Court in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States1 04 de-
97. See supra text accompanying notes 20-25.
98. Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 33.
99. Id. at 33-34.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
101. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 581-85 (1978) (Marshall, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
102. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971).
103. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
104. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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scribed disparate impact cases as claims concerning employment
practices that appear facially neutral, but which effectively treat
some groups of employees more harshly than others.10 5 As in sec-
tion 8(a)(3) inherently destructive cases, the disparate impact
cases do not require a showing of discriminatory intent or motiva-
tion to find prohibited conduct. In fact, discriminatory intent is
irrelevant in both types of cases. Instead, these cases focus on the
adverse effects of an employer's action, and the employer has an
extremely difficult burden in both types of cases to rebut the plain-
tiff's prima facie case. In section 8(a)(3) inherently destructive
cases, the Board may find an unfair labor practice even if the em-
ployer introduces evidence that business considerations motivated
its conduct.10 6 Similarly in Title VII disparate impact cases the
employer has an equally difficult task of rebutting the plaintiff's
prima facie case by showing job relatedness or business necessity
justifications for its action.10 7
(2) Section 8(a)(3) "Comparatively Slight" and Title VII
"Disparate Treatment" Cases
Title VII disparate treatment cases are analogous to section
8(a)(3) comparatively slight cases. The Board held in Wright
Line'18 that in comparatively slight cases, once the Board's general
counsel makes a prima facie showing that an employee's lawful
participation in union activities motivated an employer to dis-
charge or discipline that employee, the employer must assume the
burden to prove that it would have taken the same action in the
absence of the employee's activity.109 Disparate treatment cases
arise when an employer treats some employees less favorably than
others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin.110 Both section 8(a)(3) comparatively slight and Title VII dis-
parate treatment cases require a showing of discriminatory intent
or motivation to find prohibited employer conduct.1
The burden-shifting procedure that Wright Line established
for section 8(a)(3) comparatively slight cases is virtually identical
105. Id. at 335 n.15.
106. Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 34.
107. See Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-Impact Liability
Under Title VII, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 911 (1979).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 38-45.
109. Id.
110. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
111. Id.
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to the burden-shifting procedure that McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green112 formulated for Title VII disparate treatment cases. 113 In
McDonnell Douglas the Court held that a complainant employee
carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of dis-
crimination. 1 4 As in comparatively slight cases, once a complain-
ant establishes a prima facie case in disparate treatment actions,
the burden of proof shifts to the employer to articulate a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for its challenged action.11 5 If the
employer successfully rebuts the employee's prima facie case, the
burden shifts back to the employee to show that the reasons the
employer stated for its action were only a pretext for
discrimination.""
(c) Interchangeable Use of NLRA and Title VII Doctrines
Application of the Pullman-Standard Title VII model to sec-
tion 8(a)(3) dual motive cases is justifiable because courts fre-
quently use Title VII and NLRA doctrine interchangeably. For ex-
ample, in Wright Line a section 8(a)(3) dual motive case, the First
Circuit borrowed Title VII doctrine to determine whether the bur-
den of proof that an employer must fulfill to rebut an employee's
112. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas, the corporation discharged a black
civil rights activist during a general reduction in its work force. The discharged employee
protested vigorously that racial considerations motivated McDonnell Douglas to discharge
him. Id. at 794. McDonnell Douglas, however, argued that it discharged the employee be-
cause he illegally participated in a "stall-in" by parking his car in a place "designed to tie
up access to and egress from [its] plant at a peak traffic hour." Id. at 794-95.
113. See C. SULLIvAN, M. ZiMMER, & R. RiOHARDs, FanmL STATUTORY LAW OF EM-
PLoymzNT DIScRIMNATION 16-33 (1980); Belton, supra note 10, at 1223-50; Belton, Discrimi-
nation and Affirmative Action: An Analysis of Competing Theories of Equality and Weber,
59 N.C.L. REv. 531, 552-60 (1981).
114. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Although the requirements of prima facie
proof vary depending on the facts of each case, the Court held the employee in McDonnell
Douglas could establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that- (1) he belongs
to a racial minority; (2) he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer sought
applicants; (3) the employer rejected him despite his qualifications; and (4) after his rejec-
tion, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek qualified applicants
from persons of his qualifications. Id. at 802.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 804. The Wright Line burden-shifting test does not designate explicitly a
procedural step in which an employee can demonstrate that an employer's justifications for
its challenged action were only a pretext for discrimination. Under this test, however, an
employee may introduce evidence of pretext either while establishing a prima facie case or
after the employer attempts to rebut the employee's prima facie proof. Not all courts view
the Title VII burden-shifting procedure as requiring three distinct steps. For example, some
courts require Title VII plaintiffs to introduce evidence of pretext while establishing their
prima facie case or suffer forfeiture of this opportunity. See Sime v. Trustees of California
State Univ. & Colleges, 526 F.2d 1112 (9th Cir. 1975).
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prima facie case, by showing a business justification for its action
was a burden of production or a burden of persuasion.117 In Wright
Line the Board characterized this burden as one of persuasion.118
When the Board sought to enforce its decision in the First Circuit,
however, the First Circuit adopted the analysis set forth in Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,119 a Title VII em-
ployment discrimination case, and characterized the employer's
burden as the burden of production. 120
The Third Circuit decided Behring International, Inc. v.
NLRB 12' after the Wright Line decision and also imported this Ti-
tle VII doctrine and characterized the employer's burden in section
8(a)(3) dual motive cases as a burden of production.12 2
Because Title VII applies only to employers with fifteen or
more employees,1 2- courts have employed the NLRA aggregation of
employees of multiple entities doctrine to determine whether Title
VII applies to a particular employer. The courts of appeals and the
EEOC frequently have utilized this doctrine to allow complainants
to aggregate employees of multiple entities, such as a parent com-
pany and its franchises, subsidiary corporations, and employer as-
sociations, to meet the quota necessary to bring an action under
Title VII.124
Courts also have applied the Board-developed disloyalty doc-
trine, which concerns an employer's justifications for disciplining
or discharging an employee, in Title VII cases. The disloyalty doc-
trine reflects Congress' intent that the NLRA allow employers to
discharge or discipline employees who participate in unlawful or
disruptive acts against it.1 25For example, in McDonnell Douglas, a
Title VII action, the Court utilized the disloyalty doctrine and held
that McDonnell Douglas justified its refusal to rehire a discharged
black civil rights activist by showing that he had intentionally and
illegally used his car to block an entrance and exit road to the
117. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
118. Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 902.
119. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
120. Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 907.
121. 675 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1982).
122. In Behring, the Third Circuit stated: "We believe that the more appropriate pre-
cedent is found in the line of recent Supreme Court decisions outlining the procedure to be
followed in Title VII employment discrimination cases." Id. at 88.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
124. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 846-47 & n.66
(1976).
125. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804.
1116 [Vol. 36:1095
SECTION 8(a)(3) DUAL MOTIVE CASES
plant during a peak traffic hour.12
The issue concerning awards of back-pay to reinstated em-
ployees provides a final example of the interchangeable use of
NLRA and Title VII doctrine. THE NLRA contains a "make
whole" policy that allows the Board to award full compensation to
workers for losses resulting from an employer's unfair labor prac-
tice.127 To promote this policy, the NLRA allows the Board to
award back-pay to improperly discharged employees. 128 When
Congress enacted Title VII, it modeled Title VII's backpay provi-
sion after a similar NLRA provision and also borrowed the
NLRA's make whole policy.1 29
2. Historical Justifications: The Hartsell Mills Pure Question of
Fact Concept
Historical justifications exist for applying the Pullman-Stan-
dard Title VII model to section 8(a)(3) dual motive cases to clas-
sify the issue of discriminatory intent as a question of fact and to
define the scope of federal appellate review of Board findings of
discriminatory intent. Traditionally, discussion concerning the
scope of appellate review of a fact finder's decision has concen-
trated upon whether the issue before the reviewing court was a
question of fact or a question of law.130 For example, Professor
Kenneth Davis explains that appellate "courts should decide ques-
tions of law but limit themselves to determining whether findings
of fact are reasonable" and whether a fact finder has abused its
discretion.131
A determination of whether an employer "discriminated"
126. Id. at 803-05. The Court in McDonnell Douglas relied on the opinion in NLRB v.
Fansteel Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939). In Fansteel, the Court upheld an employer's act of
discharging employees who had illegally seized and forcibly retained the employer's factory
buildings in an illegal sit-down strike. The Court discussed the employer's disloyalty justifi-
cation for its action as follows:
We are unable to conclude that Congress intended to compel employers to retain per-
sons in their employ regardless of their unlawful conduct,--to invest those who go on
strike with an immunity from discharge for acts of trespass or violence against the
employer's property .... Apart from the question of the constitutional validity of an
enactment of that sort, it is enough to say that such a legislative intention should be
found in some definite and unmistakable expression.
NLRB v. Fansteel Corp., 306 U.S. at 255.
127. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419-20 (1975).
128. Id. at 420.
129. Id.
130. K. DAvis, ADmiUsTRATIVz LAW TaXT 525 (1972).
131. Id.
1983] 1117
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
against an employee in a section 8(a)(3) comparatively slight case
raises two separate questions: what constituted the employer's ac-
tions, and whether the employer's actions fall within the realm of
unlawful discrimination. The first question is a question of fact,
and the second question is a question of law. Triers of fact and
appellate courts, however, often do not distinguish between the
terms "discriminatory intent" and "unlawful discrimination." The
question of fact includes the issue of whether the employer acted
with discriminatory intent or motive. The question of law concerns
the question of whether the employer's discriminatory intent, to-
gether with the other facts in a case, support an ultimate finding of
unlawful discrimination. In a particular case, then, the question
whether the defendant discriminated may be a question of fact or
of law or both. Resolution of this problem depends whether the
parties dispute what motivated the employer, or whether they
agree about the employer's actions but dispute that the action con-
stitutes unlawful discrimination, or both." 2
Generally, once an employee presents evidence sufficient to
demonstrate that an employer acted with discriminatory intent,
the employee has established a prima facie case of unlawful dis-
crimination as a matter of law, unless the employer demonstrates
that the same action would have taken place even in the absence of
the protected conduct.138 An employee, however, rarely would pre-
sent evidence sufficient to demonstrate discriminatory intent, but
have other facts support a legal conclusion of no unlawful
discrimination.1 34
Although establishment of the facts of an employer's action
may be relatively easy in most cases, demonstration of discrimina-
tory intent is often more difficult. Employers seldom admit that
discriminatory intent motivated their actions. Thus, the Board
typically must infer this intent from the evidence that parties pre-
sent to it at an administrative hearing. This method of determin-
ing discriminatory intent is also a question of fact because, as Pro-
fessor Davis contends, "the heart of the fact finding process often
132. See id. at 545.
133. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089.
134. The rare situation in which an employee established a prima facie case of dis-
criminatory intent, but other facts supported a finding of no unlawful discrimination hypo-
thetically could arise in Title VII cases and section 8(a)(3) dual motive cases. This could
occur when an employer clearly had an illegitimate motive for disciplining or discharging an
employee but showed that the illegitimate motive played no part in its decision to discipline
or discharge and established a "just cause" defense for that action.
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is the drawing of inferences from the evidence." 3 5
The Supreme Court recently distinguished between discrimi-
natory intent and unlawful discrimination in a Title VII case. 3 6
Two federal courts of appeals, however, implicitly made this dis-
tinction during the 1940's and 1950's when they characterized as a
fact finding process the Board's method of inferring discriminatory
intent from circumstantial evidence in section 8(a)(3) cases.137 For
example, in Hartsell Mills Co. v. NLRB13 8 the Fourth Circuit con-
sidered whether discriminatory intent motivated an employer to
fire an employee who served as president of the local chapter of a
labor union that Hartsell Mills disliked and who participated in
various acts of misconduct prior to his discharge. 13  The Board
found that the employee's lawful election as president of the disfa-
vored union's local chapter was the primary motive for Hartsell
Mills's decision. Consequently, it held that Hartsell Mills violated
section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.140 The Fourth Circuit upheld the
Board's order by reasoning that the Board's findings of discrimina-
tory intent were pure questions of fact.141 Further, the court de-
cided that because direct evidence of discriminatory intent is
rarely available in section 8(a)(3) cases, the Board could resolve
this factual question by drawing inferences of this intent from cir-
cumstantial evidence.142 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the
Board's legitimately drawn findings of discriminatory intent bind
the courts of appeals. "3 The Fourth Circuit continued to cite
Hartsell Mills for the "pure question of fact" proposition until
1957. 14 The Eighth Circuit also followed Hartsell Mills, albeit less
frequently, until 1954.145 The Hartsell Mills pure question of fact
proposition fell into disuse after 1957, although no court ever over-
135. K. DAvis, supra note 130, at 532-33.
136. In Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982), Justice Brennan's majority opinion
distinguished between unlawful discrimination and discriminatory intent under Title VII.
He specifically classified discriminatory intent as a factual question, and left little doubt
that the majority felt that unlawful discrimination was a question of law. Id. at 2535.
137. See NLRB v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 216 F.2d 161, 164 (8th
Cir. 1954); Hartsell Mills Co. v. NLRB, 111 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1940).
138. 111 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1940).
139. Id. at 292.
140. Id. at 292-93.
141. Id. at 293.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See NLRB v. Southern Desk Co., 246 F.2d 53, 54 (4th Cir. 1957).
145. See NLRB v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 216 F.2d 161, 164 (8th
Cir. 1954).
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ruled it.
Two possible explanations exist for the apparent demise of
Hartsell Mills' classification of discriminatory intent as a pure
question of fact in section 8(a)(3) cases. The first explanation is
the Court's creation of the "ultimate facts" concept in Baumgart-
ner v. United States.146 The Supreme Court defined ultimate facts
as a higher order of facts that effectively receive the same standard
of judicial review as questions of law. The ultimate facts concept,
however, in light of Pullman-Standard's reversal of Baumgartner
and its classification of discriminatory intent as a pure question of
fact in Title VII cases, 147 no longer justifies characterization of dis-
criminatory intent as something other than a pure question of fact
in section 8(a)(3) dual motive cases. A second possible explanation
for the disappearance of the Hartsell Mills pure question of fact
proposition is the recent judicial trend to deemphasize the law-fact
distinction.1 48 Pullman-Standard, however, arguably reversed this
trend for purposes of finding discriminatory intent and prohibits
federal appellate courts from characterizing discriminatory intent
as anything other than a pure question of fact in Title VII cases.1 49
Thus, because the Court's opinion in Pullman-Standard undercut
possible explanations for judicial abandonment of the Hartsell
Mills pure question of fact characterization, the courts can justify
adopting the Pullman-Standard model and recharacterizing dis-
criminatory intent as a pure question of fact in section 8(a)(3) dual
motive cases.
3. Furtherance of Congressional Intent
Utilization of the Pullman-Standard model to resolve the
question concerning the roles of the Board and the courts of ap-
peals in finding discriminatory intent in section 8(a)(3) dual mo-
tive cases will further Congress' intent that the Board assume final
responsibility for development of national labor policy subject to
only limited federal appellate court review. The Supreme Court oc-
casionally has discussed the role that Congress intended the Board
to fulfill under the NLRA. For example, in NLRB v. Truck Drivers
Local Union No. 449 [Buffalo Linen],150 the Court considered
whether "the nonstruck members of a multi-employer bargaining
146. 322 U.S. 665 (1944).
147. 102 S. Ct. at 1788, 1789 n.16.
148. K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 688 (1976).
149. 102 S. Ct. at 1789.
150. 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
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association committed an unfair labor practice when, during con-
tract negotiations, they temporarily locked out their employees as
a defense to a union strike against one of their members which
imperiled the employers' common interest in bargaining on a group
basis."151 The Board upheld the employers' actions as lawful, but
the Second Circuit reversed. 52 The court reversed the Second Cir-
cuit's judgment and held that the Board properly had balanced the
legitimate interest of both the employers and employees by up-
holding the lock-out.158 The Court reasoned that although the
function of properly balancing sensitive, legitimate interests to ef-
fect national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsi-
bility, Congress committed this duty primarily to the Board, sub-
ject to only limited judicial review.'" Likewise, in NLRB V. Erie
Resistor Corp.,1 55 the Court reversed the Third Circuit and af-
firmed the Board's order that prohibited an employer from grant-
ing superseniority rights to strike replacements and returning
workers.156 Again, the Court reasoned that although the function of
balancing legitimate employer and employee interests to formulate
national labor policy is a difficult task, Congress delegated primary
responsibility to the Board, and intended only limited federal ap-
pellate court review of its decisions.1 57
Application of the Pullman-Standard Title VII model to sec-
tion 8(a)(3) dual motive cases would further Congress's desire that
the Board play the leading role in developing national labor policy.
The Pullman-Standard model would require the courts of appeals
to defer significantly to Board findings of discriminatory intent. It
would also demand that the courts of appeals remand cases in
which the Board failed to make a finding of fact because it errone-
ously interpreted the law unless the record permits only one reso-
lution of the factual issue.
151. Id. at 89 (footnote omitted).
152. Id. at 89.
153. Id. at 96-97.
154. Id. at 96.
155. 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
156. Id. at 236-37.
157. Id. at 236.
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4. Current Application of Pullman-Standard Outside the Title
VII Area
The Supreme Court in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Labo-
ratories, Inc.158 demonstrated its willingness to apply Pullman-
Standard principles to substantive legal areas less closely related
to Title VII employment discrimination than NLRA section
8(a)(3). In Inwood Laboratories the Court considered whether In-
wood, a generic drug manufacturer, violated section 32 of the
Trademark Act of 1946159 by intentionally contributing to pharma-
cist mislabeling of its prescription drugs as drugs that the respon-
dent, Ives, manufactured and held under a registered trademark.
Ives alleged that Inwood intentionally induced pharmacist misla-
beling by copying the general appearance and color of Ives' drug
capsules when Inwood began manufacturing its drug after Ives'
patent expired.160 The District Court held that Ives failed to show
sufficiently by either direct of circumstantial evidence that Inwood
intentionally induced mislabeling by pharmacists.161 The Second
Circuit, however, rejected the district court's findings and decided
that the district court failed to give sufficient weight to the evi-
dence that Ives introduced to show a pattern of illegal substitution
and mislabeling of generic drugs in the locality where the action
arose.16 Consequently, the Second Circuit held that Inwood inten-
tionally induced pharmacists to mislabel drugs in violation of the
Trademark Act.16
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding
that the Second Circuit erred in rejecting the district court's find-
ings of fact.1 6 4 The Court relied on Pullman-Standard to reason
that the clearly erroneous standard set forth in Federal Rule 52(a)
prohibits a reviewing court from substituting its interpretation of
evidence for that of the trier of fact solely because it "'might give
the facts another construction, resolve the ambiguities differently,
[or] find a more sinister cast to actions which the District Court
apparently deemed innocent."' 16 5 The Court's reasoning in Inwood
Laboratories suggests that the district court's findings concerning
158. 102 S. Ct. 2182 (1982).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1976).
160. Inwood Laboratories, 102 S. Ct. at 2184-86.
161. Id. at 2187-88.
162. Id. at 2189.
163. Id. at 2188.
164. Id. at 2190.
165. Id. at 2190 (quoting United States v. Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (1950)).
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Inwood's intent to induce pharmacist mislabeling were findings of
fact. Thus, the Court implicitly has extended its Pullman-Stan-
dard characterization of issues of intent as factual questions be-
yond the Title VII area. Because the relation between intent in
trademark law disputes and discriminatory intent in Title VII
cases is conceptually weaker than the connection between discrimi-
natory intent in Title VII and NLRA section 8(a)(3) contests,
courts can justify applying the Pullman-Standard characterization
to section 8(a)(3) dual motive cases.
B. Section 8(a)(3) Dual Motive Cases After Pullman-Standard
1. General Implications
Four basic ramifications result from application of the Pull-
man-Standard model to section 8(a)(3) dual motive cases. First,
the courts of appeals will classify the issue whether an employer
acted with discriminatory intent as a question of fact reserved for
initial determination by the Board. Second, this application will
require the courts of appeals to review deferentially the Board's
findings of discriminatory intent under the substantial evidence
standard set forth in section 10(e) of the NLRA. Third, it will
force the courts of appeals to defer significantly to Board findings
of discriminatory intent regardless of whether the credibility of
witnesses or only documentary evidence form the basis of its find-
ings. Last, it will require the courts of appeals to remand cases in
which they feel the Board made improper fact findings because the
Board erroneously interpreted the law, unless the record permits
only one resolution of the factual issue.
2. The Degree of Deference that Appellate Courts Owe to the
Board's Findings of Discriminatory Intent
Utilization of the Pullman-Standard Title VII model in sec-
tion 8(a)(3) dual motive cases will require the courts of appeals to
classify discriminatory intent as a question of fact. Unlike federal
appellate review of district court fact findings in Title VII discrim-
ination cases, which the circuit courts undertake pursuant to the
clearly erroneous standard set forth in Federal Rule 52(a), NLRA
section 10(e) requires the courts of appeals to review Board fact
findings in section 8(a)(3) cases under the substantial evidence
standard.16 8 Some courts mistakenly have interpreted the clearly
166. Federal appellate review of Board fact findings under the "substantial evidence"
1983] 1123
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
erroneous and substantial evidence standards to grant the federal
circuit courts equal degrees of judicial review of fact findings.167
"[Plolicy, authority [,1 and history," however, demonstrate that
the clearly erroneous standard gives appellate courts broader re-
viewing authority than the substantial evidence formula.6 8
The different historical and policy considerations that underlie
principles of appellate review of administrative and jury trial fact
findings on one hand, and judicial bench trial fact findings on the
other hand, are responsible for the different degrees of judicial re-
view that the clearly erroneous and substantial evidence standards
authorize.16 9 Congress based the substantial evidence standard in
section 10(e) of the NLRA on the significantly different policies
that underlie judicial deference to the fact finding of juries and
administrative officials. 170 Reviewing courts give factual findings byjuries considerable deference to allow decision-making by persons
who possess an "underlying sense of fairness of the community,"
rather than to extend this authority to single persons who, no mat-
ter how expert "might have arbitrary notions of [their] own. 17 1 To
the contrary, reviewing courts defer to administrative fact finding
to reap the benefits of the expertise and specialization that admin-
istrative officials offer. 172 Although these policies differ signifi-
cantly, they both mandate conclusions that reviewing courts
should not substitute their views for agency and jury fact findings
except in extraordinary circumstances.173
The clearly erroneous standard in Federal Rule 52(a) is based
upon the unique policies that govern appellate review of judicial
standard, although vague in meaning, ensures that the Board collects and evaluates in a
careful and workmanlike manner all relevant data concerning a factual issue. In reviewing
the "whole record" of a Board hearing, courts may examine evidence that supports or con-
tradicts the Board's findings. SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 214, 280 (1946). See
K. DAvis, supra note 130, at 530-31. Thus, as Judge Leventhal observed in Greater Boston
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923
(1971), the "substantial evidence" standard forces the Board to take a "hard look" at all
"salient" factual issues before it.
167. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sun Drug Co., Inc., 359 F.2d 408, 416 (3d Cir. 1966); NLRB v.
Southern Transport, Inc., 355 F.2d 978, 985 (8th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Browning, 268 F.2d
938, 940 (10th Cir. 1959).
168. Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative
Analysis, 58 HARv. L. REv. 70, 80-89 (1944).
169. Id. at 80-81.
170. Id. at 81.
171. Id. (citing Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REv. 111, 116
(1924)).
172. Id. at 81-82.
173. Id. at 82.
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fact finding in bench trials, which are distinguishable from those
governing judicial review of agency and jury fact finding.17 4 The
judiciary draws both individual trial court judges and panels of ap-
pellate judges from the same population; therefore, except for the
difference in numbers, trial judges are no more representative of
the general community than appellate panels. 17 5 Both groups ordi-
narily specialize only in law, and because appellate judges occupy a
superior position in the legal system, in most cases they probably
possess at least as much expertise as trial judges.17 6 Thus, the un-
derlying necessity for deferential appellate review of judicial fact
finding, although still present, is less compelling than in judicial
review of agency and jury fact finding. These considerations have
caused courts to interpret the clearly erroneous standard to au-
thorize broader judicial review than the substantial evidence stan-
dard.17 7 Consequently, application of the Pullman-Standard model
to NLRA section 8(a)(3) dual motive cases will require the courts
of appeals to give greater deference to the Board's findings of dis-
criminatory intent under the substantial evidence standard than
they currently must give district court fact findings in Title VII
discrimination cases under the Rule 52(a) clearly erroneous
standard.
V. CONCLUSION
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Board has
defined clearly the degree of deference the courts of appeals owe
Board findings concerning employer motivation in section 8(a)(3)
dual motive cases. The answer to this question depends upon
whether the courts of appeals classify the question of discrimina-
tory intent as a question of fact or law. If the courts of appeals
classify discriminatory intent as a question of fact, the substantial
evidence standard of review set forth in section 10(e) of the NLRA
will require them to review deferentially the Board's discrimina-
tory intent findings. If the courts of appeals classify discriminatory
intent as a question of law, however, they may subject the Board's
discriminatory intent findings to much broader appellate review
than the substantial evidence standard permits.
The Supreme Court, in Pullman-Standard v. Swint, however,
174. Id. at 82, 86-87.
175. Id. at 82.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Pace, 320 U.S. 698, 701. See also K. DAvis, AD-
MINISTRATriv LAW TREATISE 518-19 (Supp. 1982).
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held that the issue of discriminatory intent in Title VII employ-
ment discrimination cases is purely a question of fact reserved for
the district court's initial determination and subject to only lim-
ited review by the courts of appeals. The courts of appeals should
apply the Court's Pullman-Standard Title VII model in section
8(a)(3) dual motive cases for the following reasons. First, section
8(a)(3) relates sufficiently to Title VII to warrant application of the
Pullman-Standard model because the legal doctrines in both areas
have experienced parallel and analogous developments. Second,
federal circuit courts historically have classified discriminatory in-
tent as a question of fact, and the Pullman-Standard decision jus-
tifies a return to this position. Third, application of the Pullman-
Standard model will further Congress' intent for enacting the
NLRA that the Board assume final responsibility for development
of national labor policy subject to only limited federal appellate
court review. Last, the Supreme Court already has characterized
intent as a question of fact outside the Title VII area, and has ap-
plied Pullman-Standard to define the proper scope of appellate
review of lower court findings of intent.
Four basic ramifications result from applying the Pullman-
Standard model to section 8(a)(3) dual motive cases. First, the
courts of appeals will classify the issue whether an employer acted
with discriminatory intent as a question of fact reserved for initial
determination by the Board. Second, it will require the courts of
appeals to review the Board's findings of discriminatory intent
under the "substantial evidence" standard set forth in section
10(e) of the NLRA. Third, it will force the courts of appeals to
defer significantly to Board findings of discriminatory intent re-
gardless of whether the credibility of witnesses or only documen-
tary evidence are the basis of its findings. Last, it will require the
courts of appeals to remand cases in which they feel the Board
made improper fact findings by erroneously interpreting the law
unless the record permits only one resolution of factual issues.
Application of the Pullman-Standard Title VII model to sec-
tion 8(a)(3) dual motive cases would produce desirable results. The
Pullman-Standard model would help to clarify section 8(a)(3) law,
and consequently, contribute to the finality of judgment, reduce
delay in adjudication of disputes, decrease the caseload burden on
the federal appellate courts, and promote consistency among the
circuits concerning the determination of discriminatory intent.
More important, however, application of the Pullman-Standard
model, by clarifying the roles of the Board and the courts of ap-
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peals in finding discriminatory intent in section 8(a)(3) dual mo-
tive cases, would enable practicing attorneys to advise their clients
with greater certainty about what constitutes an unfair labor prac-
tice under section 8(a)(3) dual motive doctrine.
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